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Abstract
How much do developing countries benet from foreign investment? We contribute to
this question by comparing the employment and wage practices of foreign and domestic
rms in Brazil, using detailed matched rm-worker panel data. In order to control for
unobserved worker dierences, we examine both foreign acquisitions and divestments and
worker mobility, including the joint estimation of rm and worker xed eects. We nd
that changes in ownership do not tend to aect wages signicantly, a result that holds both
at the worker- and rm-levels. However, divestments are related to large job cuts, unlike
acquisitions. On the other hand, movers from foreign to domestic rms take larger wage cuts
than movers from domestic to foreign rms. Moreover, on average, the xed eects of foreign
rms are considerably larger than those of domestic rms, while worker selection eects are
relatively small.
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11 Introduction
How much do developing countries benet from foreign investment? This is a question with
important implications in terms of how globalisation is perceived across the world. In fact, the
popular assessment of the international benets of globalisation is perhaps still inuenced by the
view that multinationals operate `sweatshops' in developing countries. However, a considerable
body of academic work indicates that foreign rms pay higher wages than domestic rms in
several developing countries (Aitken et al. (1996), Velde & Morrisey (2003), Lipsey & Sj oholm
(2004), etc).
In this paper, we study the case of Brazil, a large developing country which has so far not
been examined in the literature about foreign-rm wage dierentials. Brazil is also an interesting
country to study due to the richness of its data, including a detailed matched employer-employee
panel data set that we use here. The quality of the data allows us to make a contribution to
the literature (which in most cases uses rm-level data, at least when considering developing
countries) also on a methodological level. Specically, we seek to address the unobserved hetero-
geneity problem that workers in foreign and domestic rms may be dierent along dimensions
not quantied in the data (Abowd et al. 1999).
In order to provide a robust contribution to our understanding of the foreign-rm wage pre-
mium in developing countries, our paper pursues four dierent but complementary approaches.
First, we examine the evolution of wages as rms change ownership type (domestic or foreign),
considering not only the case of acquisitions, when domestic rms become foreign-owned (as in
Conyon et al. (2002), Lipsey & Sj oholm (2006), etc), but also divestments, when foreign rms
are sold to domestic investors. In our view, divestments can be as informative as acquisitions.
Moreover, divestments are also interesting in their own right, particularly if one believes that
`footloose' multinationals are an important fact of life in a globalised world.
Our second approach involves conducting our analysis not only at the rm level but also
at the worker level (Martins (2004), Heyman et al. (2007), Andrews et al. (2007), Earle &
Telegdy (2007)). By considering the two levels of analysis, we are able to understand if any
changes in rm-level wages that may be observed following acquisition or divestment are due to
compositional dierences in the workforce. Indeed, even a large set of rm-level human capital
controls may not appropriately pick up workforce dierences across dierent owners.
Third, in order to address such compositional issues in more detail, we also study how job
2and worker ows evolve as rms change ownership, not only immediately after (i.e. in the rst
year under new ownership) but also over time. In fact, this aspect strikes us as an important
oversight in most of the research about the foreign-rm wage premium, as wages tend to be
studied in isolation from employment levels, although the two variables are presumably strongly
related.1
Finally, we also address the unobserved heterogeneity problem mentioned above by following
the same workers as they move across dierent domestic and foreign rms (Martins 2008). This
topic has received attention recently, although the focus has been on FDI spillovers embodied
in workers that move from foreign to domestic rms (Martins 2006, Poole 2007, Balsvik 2008),
rather than on wage dierentials between the two types of rms. Moreover, we are amongst the
rst to estimate jointly worker and rm xed eects (Abowd et al. 2002) in the international
economics literature. Again, this type of analysis is only possible with matched employer-
employee panel data as the one we use here, so that one can follow workers over time, at
dierent employers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of only two papers that considers both acquisitions
and worker mobility while also studying changes from domestic to foreign rms and vice-versa.
The other paper employing a similar approach is Andrews et al. (2007), which considers the
case of Germany.2 However, as far as we know, our paper is the rst to examine foreign-rm
wage dierentials in a developing country using matched employer-employee panel data. As
mentioned above, we also pay particular attention to employment ows and to the contrast
between the rm- and the worker-levels of analysis, unlike most of the literature.
In our results, based on a matched sample of about 1350 manufacturing-sector rms, observed
from 1995 to 1999, and a total of about 3.3 million worker-years, we nd that both acquisitions
and divestments do not tend to aect wages signicantly. However, although this result holds
simultaneously at the rm- and the worker-levels, divestments are related to large job cuts,
while acquisitions are not followed by signicant employment dierences. Moreover, movers
from foreign to domestic rms take larger wage cuts than movers from domestic to foreign rms
(and the latter in many cases see their pay increase or at least not decrease). Finally, when
estimating worker and rm xed eects simultaneously, we nd that the xed eects of foreign
1See Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) for an early study of the employment eects of mergers and acquisitions.
2Andrews et al. (2007) examine approximately 14,000 rms in 2000 and 2004, across East and West Germany,
and focus on the case of acquisitions. In some analyses they also assume random mobility and estimate worker
and rm eects simultaneously. Overall, their results indicate small `takeover' eects of domestic rms by foreign
investors, not exceeding 3%. See Andrews et al. (2007) also for a detailed survey of the literature on the foreign-
rm pay premium.
3rms are on average considerably large than those of domestic rms. On the other hand, the
dierences in the worker xed eects are minor.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the data; Sections 3 and 4
describe the rm- and worker-level analysis, respectively; and Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Data
The main data set used in this paper is RAIS (`Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais', Annual
Social Data Report), a census of all rms and all their formal-sector employees in Brazil con-
ducted by the Ministry of Labour. The data include detailed information about each employee
(wages, hours worked, education, age, tenure, gender, worker nationality, etc) and each rm
(industry, region, size, establishment type, etc) in each year, plus a unique identier for each
employee, each establishment and each rm.3
Although RAIS is particularly rich, it does not include information on (foreign) rm owner-
ship. In order to use such information, we draw on two additional rm-level data sources that
we merge in using a common rm identier. The rst data source is CCE (Foreign Capitals
Census), a census conducted every ve years by the Central Bank of Brazil. These data con-
sider all rms which have at least 50% of their capital owned by foreign investors. Morevoer,
the census collects detailed information about the foreign ownership structure of rms based in
Brazil, including additional data such as exports, imports, location, activity sector, number of
employees. We use the information from the 1995 census in order to classify each rm in our
sample as domestic or foreign in that rst year of our analysis.
The second additional rm-level data source we use is the information compiled by DeNegri
(2003) about rms that changed their foreign/domestic nature after 1995. In order to obtain this
information, DeNegri (2003) examined a third data set, PIA (Yearly Manufacturing Survey),
which is conducted across all rms in the manufacturing sector with at least 30 employees plus
a sample of rms with between 5 and 30 employees. PIA includes data about changes in rm
ownership in each rm. Based on this information, DeNegri (2003) establishes if and in which
year rms change their domestic/foreign status between 1995 and 2000.
When creating our data set, we decided to consider only (manufacturing sector) rms with
at least 100 employees in 1995. While the rm size threshold is originally designed to meet our
computational constraints, in fact such threshold is not particularly binding. As most foreign
3See Appendix D for more details on RAIS. See also Martins & Esteves (2006) for a recent application.
4rms in Brazil and elsewhere employ 100 or more workers, a rigorous `like-for-like' comparison
of domestic and foreign rms would in fact require disregarding smaller rms. Furthermore, in
order to ensure we draw on a homogeneous group of rms, we conducted a propensity score
matching analysis (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983) to remove from our sample those rms that
displayed `non-comparable' observable characteristics in 1995.
Specically, we adopted a `nearest-neighbour' matching method, so that each foreign rm
was matched to its most `similar' domestic counterpart (in terms of their characteristics in 1995,
as indicated by the propensity score). In the construction of this propensity score, we used a
large set of covariates, including three-digit industry dummies, state dummies, and quadratics in
rm size and the level of exports and in the averages of worker age, gender, schooling and tenure.
Moreover, we also imposed a `common support' condition, so that foreign rms which could not
be matched (because their propensity score was `too' dierent - more than 0.01 dierent - from
the propensity score of the `closest' domestic rm) were dropped from the data.4 Finally, after
selecting the matched rms in 1995, a total 678 foreign rms and 669 domestic rms, we nally
match in their data for 1996 to 1999.
It is due to the richness of the data and/or our computational constraints that we consider
in our analysis a period of not more than ve years (1995 to 1999). Although this time frame
is not particularly long, it is important to underline that this was a period characterised by
a large number of mergers and acquisitions in Brazil (KPMG 2001). As mentioned in the
Introduction, such changes in rm ownership play a very important role in the identication
strategy adopted here. Moreover, Brazil also followed the international trend of increasing
foreign direct investment ows over the period, as can be seen in Figure 1.
As only a small number of rms exit the data, there is a total of 6,337 rm-year obser-
vations. Moreover, about 8% of the rms in the data exhibit a change in foreign/domestic
ownership - a total of exactly 100 changes, 51 of which being acquisitions (domestic rms ac-
quired by foreign investors) and the remaining 49 divestments. As to the time distributions of
the ownership changes, while the divestments are spread out over the 1996-1999 period, the ac-
quisitions are very strongly concentrated in 1997, which was in fact a `boom year' for such forms
of rm entry/expansion (KPMG 2001). There are more than 1.1 million individuals, observed
approximately 3.3 million times. 1.8 million of these worker-years are employed in foreign rms.
4We also checked that the balancing of the covariates across the matched foreign and domestic rms was
`satisfactory'. For instance, the pseudo R
2 from the estimation of the propensity score, including all variables
mentioned above and using only the matched rms, falls to less than 5%. These results are available upon request.
53 Firm-level analysis
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Given the richness of the data, we consider a large set of rm- and worker-level variables in
our analysis. Most of these variables are derived directly from the original data set, but other
variables were constructed by us, based on such original variables. The latter group includes
worker ow variables, which are created from the worker-level data and then merged back into
the rm-level data.
All ow variables (job and workers) are dened in the way that has become standard in
the literature (Davis et al. 1996). Each rate is constructed by dividing a given ow by the
average employment of the rm over the two periods analysed. Specically, the job creation
rate is dened as JCt =
Lt Lt 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), if Lt > Lt 1, or JCt = 0, if Lt < Lt 1, in which Lt
denotes the number of workers in period t. Similarly, the job destruction rate is dened as
JDt =
Lt Lt 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), if Lt < Lt 1, or JDt = 0, if Lt > Lt 1. Moreover, the net job creation rate
(NJCRt) corresponds to JCt   JDt and the job reallocation rate (JRt) is JCt + JDt.
In terms of worker ows, the hiring rate is Ht =
Hiringst;t 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), in which Hiringst;t 1 denotes
the number of workers present in the rm in the period t but not in period t   1, and the
separation rate is S =
Separationst;t 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1) , in which Separationst;t 1 denotes the number of workers
present in the rm in the period t   1 but nor in period t. Finally, the worker reallocation rate
(WRt) is Ht+Rt, and the churning rate (CRt), a measure of `excessive turnover' (Burgess et al.
2000), is dened here as WRt   JRt.
Before conducting regression analyses, we provide some comparisons from the raw data. We
compare three types of rms, the rst category (Table 1) corresponding to rms that do not
switch nationality, i.e. either rms that are always domestic owned (left-hand-side columns) or
rms that are always foreign owned (right-hand-side columns). The second type of rms corre-
sponds to acquisitions - domestic rms that are acquired by foreign investors (Table 2), in which
the left-hand-side columns describe those rms before they undergo their change in ownership
and the right-hand-side columns describe those rms after the change in ownership. Finally,
the third category (Table 3) corresponds to divestments - foreign rms that are acquired by
domestic investors. Again, the left-hand-side columns describe those rms before they undergo
their change in ownership and the right-hand-side columns describe those rms after the change
in ownership. In all tables, the very last column displays the p-value of the test of the equality
6of the means of each variables across the two subsamples.
Each table describes average worker characteristics of each rm-year, in which all rm-years
are weighted equally, regardless of rm size. Besides the standard human capital variables
(schooling, experience, gender, tenure), and real wages and real wage growth, we also present
information about the workers' nationality (Brazilian or non-Brazilian). Finally, we also include
descriptive statistics about job and worker ows and year dummy variables.
First, when comparing always-domestic and always-foreign rms (Table 1), we nd that,
amongst other dierences, the latter group exhibits more educated workers, a greater percentage
of foreign workers (1.8% against 0.6%), larger rms and higher log wages (2.61 against 2.05).
Job and worker ows are also dierent, as foreign rms exhibit less job destruction (and more
net job creation), and also less worker reallocation and churning.5
Table 2 compares rms before and after they are acquired (i.e. before and after they move
from domestic to foreign ownership). We nd that average education increases, that the fe-
male share falls considerably, while rm size falls only marginally (and not signicantly). Job
reallocation increases while churning falls but not signicantly.
Finally, Table 3 compares the same rms, before and after they are divested (i.e. before and
after they move from foreign to domestic ownership). We nd that, again, the female share falls
considerably and so does the rm size (from 230 to 97 workers), while the remaining variables
generally do not change in a signicant way, the main exception being job reallocation that
almost doubles.
Overall, our ndings from the descriptive statistics suggest that acquisitions and divestments
are dierent processes, not only in terms of the before-after changes in rm and worker char-
acteristics but also in terms of the type of rms subject to each type of change of ownership
(i.e. when comparing the left columns of Tables 2 and 3). For instance, divested rms tend
to be much smaller, to pay lower wages and to have workers with lower levels of tenure when
compared to acquired rms. The divested rms also exhibit more worker turnover, more job
destruction and less net job creation even before they are divested. With respect to before-after
changes in rm characteristics, divestments seem to involve much higher job cuts but higher
increases in pay when compared to acquisitions.
In the next section, we extend these comparisons to a regression framework.
5Part of these dierences may be driven by composition issues related to dierences in the number of periods
the rms are present in the data, before and after the acquisition.
73.2 Results
Our empirical analysis involves the estimation of wage, size and job and worker ow equations,
rstly using data aggregated at the rm level. In the case of wages, the equation we consider,
based on equation 12 and the discussion in Appendix C, is:
wit = X0
it1 + F0
it2 + 3Forit + i + t + it; (1)
in which wit represents the logarithm of the average real wage of rm i in year t, X is a vector
of worker controls aggregated at the rm level (schooling, quadratics in tenure and experience,
the percentage of women, and the percentage of foreign workers), F are rm controls (log rm
size - measured by the number of workers -, and industry and state dummies), For is the foreign-
rm dummy variable, i are rm xed eects and t year xed eects. 3 is the parameter of
interest, indicating the average wage dierence between domestic and foreign rms.
We also decompose the wage dierential between acquisitions and divestments. In fact, there
are no `a priori' reasons for the eect of such changes in ownership to be symmetric, i.e. for
the eects of divestments to be equal to minus the eect of acquisitions. We carry out this
decomposition by considering the following wage equation:
wit = X0
it1 + F0
it2 + 3DFit + 4FDit + i + t + it; (2)
in which all variables take the same meaning as in equation 1, DFit is a dummy variable
taking value one if a rm-year is currently foreign owned and was in a previous period domestic
owned, and FDit is a dummy variable taking value one if a rm-year is currently domestic owned





1 if Forit = 1 and Fori;t=1 = 0;







1 if Forit = 0 and Fori;t=1 = 1;
0 if Forit = 1 or Fori;t=1 = 0:
(4)
3 and 4 are the parameters of interest, indicating the average change in wages for rms
that undergo acquisitions or divestments, respectively.
8Table 4 presents the results for each one of the two specications. Columns 1-4 consider
dierent versions of equation 1 while columns 5-8 consider dierent versions of equation 2. The
OLS results corroborate the standard nding that foreign rms pay higher wages, the premium
ranging from more than 50%, when only rm-level control variables are included, to more than
25%, when worker-level control variables are also included.6 However, once the specication
includes rm xed eects (i.e. once the identication of the foreign rm dierence is based on
acquisitions and divestments), we nd that there are no signicant wage dierences between the
two types of rms.
Moreover, we also nd that, when disentangling the wage dierences between acquisitions
and divestments, there are no signicant dierences between the two types of ownership change.
This result is robust to controlling for worker characteristics (column 6) and to restricting the
sample to the last year before ownership change and the rst year after that (columns 7 and
8). While there is evidence of a signicant wage decrease following an acquisition, the lack of
precision of the coecient for divestments rules out the rejection of the equality of the two eects.
It is also interesting to notice that changes in some worker characteristics are very signicant
in predicting wage changes: for instance, increases in the percentage of foreign workers tend to
be associated with (particularly large) increases in wages, while increases in the percentage of
female workers tend to be associated with declines in wages.
For the remaining dependent variables that we analyse in Tables 5-9 (rm size, job creation,
job destruction, job reallocation, worker reallocation and churning), we consider exactly the
same specications as for wages, except that we do not include the measure of rm size in the
list of regressors. In the case of rm size (Table 5), we nd, as suggested by the analysis of
the descriptive statistics, that foreign rms are bigger. This result also holds after controlling
for rm xed eects. Actually, it even increases once controlling for rm xed eects, which
is consistent with the fact that our sample is matched in 1995 characteristics, including size.
Moreover, once we separate the foreign rm dummy into the `D-to-F switcher' and the `F-to-D
switcher' dummies, we obtain evidence that most of the eect is driven from the downsizing of
rms that undergo divestment, as there is no eect from rms that are acquired.
The results for net job creation rates (Table 6) are similar to those for rm size: Foreign rms
are shown to exhibit higher net job creation rates and most of the eect comes from the lower
6These dierentials are, however, relatively large when compared to other studies. This is particularly striking
as these dierentials are driven from a matched sample of rms and, in the specication with worker characteristics,
a control for the nationality of the worker is included.
9rates exhibited by `F-to-D switchers', not from higher rates for `D-to-F switchers'. However, the
dierence is not signicant in two specications, although the point estimates are still consistent
with the remaining results.7 Overall, the robustness of the results across Tables 5 and 6 is
important as it addresses, at least in part, the possibility that rms undergoing divestment are
already cutting their job levels before the process of change of ownership begins. In such a case,
net job creation would already be negative just before divestment, leading to smaller and/or
insignicant estimates, which we do not nd in these results.
Given that job creation is very small across the rms in our sample, our results about this
variable (not reported) are almost always insignicant or indicating very small dierences across
the two types of rms (slightly larger for foreign rms, but only in specications without rm
xed eects). Unsurprisingly, Table 7, which presents estimates for job destruction, indicates
similar results as the net job creation rate, although of the opposite sign. We nd that foreign
rms exhibit less job destruction than domestic rms although the dierences are in some cases
insignicant.
Consistent with the previous tables, we nd that job reallocation (the sum of job creation
and job destruction) is signicantly lower in foreign rms, while `F-to-D' switchers are the main
drivers of such eect (Table 8). A similar result is found when addressing worker reallocation
(the sum of worker hirings and worker separations - see Table 9).8
4 Worker-level analysis
Here we address the unobserved heterogeneity problem by following the same workers as they
move across dierent domestic and foreign rms. Again, this is only possible using matched
employer-employee panel data, so that one can trace workers over time and focus, for instance,
on those who change employers.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We consider ve types of workers: stayers, `movers' through acquisitions, `movers' through
divestments, movers from domestic to foreign rms and, nally, movers from foreign to domestic
7This may be explained by the fact that considering net job creation rates (or any other job or worker ow)
forces us to reduce the sample size, as such rates cannot be calculated for the rst observation of each rm in the
data.
8We also consider the case of churning, a measure of `excessive' worker turnover, measured by the dierence
between worker and job reallocation but we nd no signicant dierences (results not reported). This can be
explained by the fact that rms undergoing divestment exhibit very large job destruction rates and such job cuts
and separations do not tend to involve simultaneous hirings.
10rms. In each table and for each type of mover we present descriptive statistics about the worker
and the worker's rm before and after the movement (left and right columns, respectively). In
the case of stayers, we present descriptive statistics separately for stayers in domestic and foreign
rms.
Table 10 refers to the latter cases, which also correspond to the largest category in our
data. We nd more than 0.8 million workers-year that stay in the same domestic rms between
1995 and 1999 and more than 1.2 million workers-year that stay in the same foreign rms over
the same period. According to the table, some of the most important dierences are related to
tenure (higher for workers in foreign rms), nationality (twice as many foreign workers in foreign
rms, in proportional terms), rm size, pay and pay growth (all bigger in foreign rms). The
net job creation rate and the worker reallocation rate are also higher in foreign rms. (Given
the large size of the data, all dierences are statistically signicant at any conventional levels.)
When considering instead workers that stay in rms that are subject to acquisition (Table
11), we nd that tenure tends to increase while the percentage of female workers and the size of
the rm falls. (Bear in mind that, although these workers are the same in the two periods, their
distribution is not necessarily the same: the changes in their observable characteristics is related
to dierences in terms of how many times each workers appears before and after the change in
his/her status.) Moreover, pay and pay growth increase while net job creation also increases.
Table 12 considers divestments. An important dierence between the periods before and
after the change in ownership is probably the decrease in rm size, from an average of 182
workers in foreign rms to an average of 134 when in domestic rms. We also nd that pay and
pay growth increase, although only the latter signicantly.
We now consider the case of workers that move between rms. Table 13 presents descriptive
statistics for workers that move from a domestic to a foreign rm. As expected, there is a
signicantly larger percentage of workers that are new hires. (However, not all are new hires, as
we keep following these workers after they move.) Pay and pay growth increases signicantly.
Comparing rm-level job and worker ow rates, we nd that movers from domestic to foreign
rms tend to become employed in rms with higher job (gross and net) creation rates and worker
reallocation.
Finally, we consider the case of workers that move from a foreign to a domestic rm (Table
14). Unlike in the previous case, pay and pay growth tend to fall. Comparing rm-level job and
worker ow rates, we nd that, amongst other results, movers from domestic to foreign rms
11tend to become employed in rms with low job (gross and net) creation rates.
4.2 Regression results




it2 + 3Forit + i + t + it; (5)
in which wit represents the logarithm of the real wage of worker i in year t, X is a vector of
worker controls (schooling, quadratics in tenure and experience, a female dummy, and a foreign
worker dummy), F is log rm size and industry and region dummy variables, and Forit is
the foreign-rm dummy variable. 3 is the parameter of interest, indicating the average wage
dierence between domestic and foreign rms.
Table 15 presents the results of equation 5 without rm-level controls and Table 16 presents
the same results including rm-level controls (F). First, we nd from the simple OLS, pooled
data models that wages are not signicantly higher in foreign rms, although the point estimate
suggests a premium of about 10%, even after controlling for several human capital variables,
including the worker's nationality. However, when moving to specications with worker xed
eects (i.e. when our estimation of the foreign-rm wage premium relies on workers that switch
between rm types or workers that stay in rms that are acquired/divested), we nd a much
smaller premium, again insignicant.
Moreover, when decomposing such premium in the wage dierence driven by acquisitions or
divestments and the wage dierence driven by worker mobility, we nd that the wage dierence
in the rst case is virtually zero while the dierence from mobility is about 4% (columns 3 and
4). These dierences hold when using only observations from the period immediately before or
immediately after the change in rm status (columns 5 and 6). Moreover, all results are robust
to controlling for rm characteristics (Table 16), except that the OLS result is now signicant.
As before, in the rm-level analysis, we are also interested in decomposing the foreign rm
eect into changes from domestic to foreign and vice-versa. In order to do this, we now estimate
new individual-level wage equations as follows:
wit = X0
it1 + F0
it2 + 3DFit + 4FDit + i + t + it; (6)
in which all variables are dened in the same way as in equation 5, while DFit is a dummy
12taking value one if the worker is currently employed in a foreign rm, having been employed in
a domestic rm in the previous period, and FDit is a dummy taking value one if the worker is






1 if Forit = 1 and Fori;t 1 = 0;







1 if Forit = 0 and Fori;t 1 = 1;
0 if Forit = 1 or Fori;t 1 = 0:
(8)
3 and 4 are the parameters of interest, indicating the average dierence in wages of workers
that switch from a domestic to a foreign rm or from a foreign to a domestic rm, respectively.
Table 17 presents the results of equation 6 without rm-level controls. The results indicate
that foreign-to-domestic mobility is generally associated to wage cuts. On the other hand,
domestic-to-foreign mobility is either associated to wage gains (column 6) or wage cuts that
are smaller than those of foreign-to-domestic movers. These ndings are corroborated when
including rm-level controls (Table 18).
Unlike before, the overall dierence between foreign and domestic rms is driven by both
stayers and movers: movers that switch from a foreign to a domestic rms take a signicant
pay cut of about 9%, while the wage dierence for switchers from domestic to foreign rms is
about 7% (columns 3 and 4). When considering only workers-year observed immediately before
or after the change in rm type, the coecients either are not signicant or only domestic-
to-foreign movers increase their pay. All these results are generally robust to the inclusion of
rm-level controls - see Table 18.
4.3 Firm and worker xed eects
Finally, we estimate wage equations including simultaneously worker and rm xed eects
(Abowd et al. 1999):
wit = X0
it1 + F0
it2 +  j(i;t) + i + t + it; (9)
in which all variables are dened as before and  j(i;t) denotes a rm xed eect (j(i;t)
corresponding to the rm where worker i works in period t).
13As it is well known in the literature, the estimation of these models relies on workers that
move between rms, a process which we have documented in some detail in this section. In prac-
tical terms, we pursue the methods discussed in Abowd et al. (2002) and the routine developed
in Ouazad (2006).9 These methods involve the identication in the data of a (large) group of
workers and their rms amongst whom there are connections via worker mobility. In our case,
this rst group accounts for about 95% of the entire data. Under the assumption that mobility
is exogenous (and normalising worker xed eects so that their sum is equal to zero), one can
then estimate the two sets of xed eects.
Our results indicate a considerable degree of dispersion across either worker or rms - see
Figures 2 and 3. However, the average rm eect for domestic rms is .413 while the same
number for foreign rms is .644 (these averages are computed by considering all rms-year in
which a rm is either domestic or foreign owned). On the other hand, we nd that the average
worker eect when the worker is employed by a domestic rm is -.04 while the average worker
eect when the worker is employed by a foreign rm is -.026 (similarly to the previous case, these
worker averages are computed by considering all workers-year in which a worker is employed in
either a domestic or a foreign rm).
Overall, the results provide strong support of more generous wage policies oered by foreign
rms, as the average xed eect of the latter is approximately .23 log points higher than the
average rm xed eect of domestic rms. On the other hand, the results suggest that worker
selection issues across domestic and foreign rms are of a much smaller importance, as their
dierence is only .066 log points, or about one fourth of the average dierence documented from
the rm xed eects.
5 Discussion
How much do developing countries benet from foreign investment? We contribute to this
question by comparing the employment and wage practices of foreign and domestic rms in
Brazil, using detailed matched rm-worker panel data. In order to control for unobserved
worker dierences, we examine not only acquisitions (when foreign investors acquire domestic
rms) but also divestments (when domestic investors acquire foreign rms). Moreover, we also
consider the wage implications of worker mobility, from foreign to domestic rms and vice-versa.
Throughout our analyses we also pay particular attention to employment levels at the dierent
9See Martins (forthcoming) for a recent illustration of this method in a dierent context.
14types of rms and to the dierences between the rm- and worker-levels.
We nd that both types of acquisitions (domestic to foreign or vice-versa) do not tend to
aect wages signicantly, a result consistent with the literature (Martins 2004, Heyman et al.
2007, Andrews et al. 2007). However, although this wage result holds both at the rm- and the
worker-levels, divestments tend to lead to large job cuts, unlike acquisitions. In other words,
divestments appear to involve much more job reallocation that acquisitions, a new result in this
area of research.
One possible implication of this result is that, in general, the comparability of acquisition and
the divestment wage results may need to be considered carefully. For instance, the wage changes
of workers involved in acquisitions may be more `representative' than the wage changes of workers
involved in divestments. This would be the case if the new owners following a divestment tend
to oer lower pay to a greater share of their workforce, prompting a larger number of workers
to leave, when compared to the case of foreign acquisitions. A complementary interpretation
involves the reassignment of workers in divested rms to other rms of the same group of the
new owner.
We also nd that, while movers from foreign to domestic rms typically take (large) wage
cuts when they move, movers from domestic to foreign rms tend to either take lower wage
cuts or to maintain or even to increase their pay (Martins (2008) presents similar evidence using
Portuguese matched data). Of course, this process of worker mobility may be subject to selection
issues. In any case, the fact that workers that leave domestic rms and become employed by
foreign investors receive lower wage decreases or wage increases can be interpreted as evidence
of more generous wage policies being oered by foreign rms.
Moreover, such ndings are reinforced by our novel estimates of worker and rm xed ef-
fects. Although this analysis indicated considerable dispersion of both types of xed eects -
an interesting nding that merits further research -, the xed eects of foreign rms were, on
average, much higher than those of domestic rms. On top of that, our results also suggest that
selection issues may not be important, as the dierence of the average worker xed eects across
domestic and foreign rms were relatively small.
From a methodological point of view, the ndings in our paper underline the importance
of considering employment issues when studying changes in ownership, particularly when one
wants to address wage dierentials. We also present evidence that the related theme of worker
mobility can be particularly illuminating from the point of view of assessing the role of foreign
15rms in labour markets. From the point of view of the debate of the eects of globalisation,
our results suggest that foreign rms play a positive role in the labour market of Brazil and,
perhaps, other developing countries.
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil (Manufacturing), 1980-2000
Source: Muendler (2003). Unit: Millions of US dollars.
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19Figure 2: Distribution of rm eects
Source: Authors' calculations.
20Figure 3: Distribution of worker eects
Source: Authors' calculations.
21Table 1: Non-acquired rms - descriptive statistics. Sample: only rms that are either
always domestic or always foreign owned over the period 1995-1999
Always domestic Always foreign
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-test
Schooling 7.551 1.978 2788 9.375 2.085 3088 0.000
Experience 20.447 4.827 2786 17.861 3.746 3087 0.000
Tenure 63.640 32.069 2788 64.943 28.302 3088 0.098
Female 0.185 0.195 2788 0.187 0.177 3088 0.608
Foreign Worker 0.006 0.016 2788 0.018 0.049 3088 0.000
Firm Size 317.428 819.872 2788 413.229 1077.781 3088 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.045 0.556 2786 2.608 0.561 3085 0.000
Change in log pay 0.007 0.257 2160 0.015 0.275 2429 0.338
Foreign rm 0.000 0.000 2788 1.000 0.000 3088 .
Job creation rate 0.053 0.133 2164 0.060 0.152 2434 0.075
Job destruction rate 0.176 0.328 2184 0.133 0.275 2445 0.000
Net job creation rate -0.124 0.381 2164 -0.073 0.339 2434 0.000
Job reallocation rate 0.228 0.327 2184 0.193 0.287 2445 0.000
Worker reallocation rate 0.504 0.336 2164 0.452 0.327 2434 0.000
Churning rate 0.273 0.246 2164 0.258 0.249 2434 0.040
1995 0.217 0.412 2788 0.208 0.406 3088 0.431
1996 0.215 0.411 2788 0.207 0.405 3088 0.437
1997 0.199 0.399 2788 0.201 0.401 3088 0.843
1998 0.188 0.391 2788 0.195 0.396 3088 0.496
1999 0.181 0.385 2788 0.189 0.392 3088 0.453
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of rms that do not change their domestic/foreign status over the
1995-1999 period. Each rm-year carries the same weight. Schooling refers to the average schooling (measured in
years) of the workforce of the rm in each year; experience is dened as Mincer experience; tenure is measured in
months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking value one for workers who are not Brazilian nationals, `rm size' is
measured as the (spell-weighted) number of workers in the rm, and pay is measured in 2006 `reais'. Job creation
rate and the following job and worker ow rates are dened in the standard way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc,
are dummy variables for each year.
22Table 2: Acquisitions - descriptive statistics. Sample: rms that are initially domestic
owned and are then acquired by foreign investors
Domestic ownership Foreign ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-value
Schooling 8.505 1.704 98 9.289 1.665 140 0.000
Experience 18.595 3.111 98 17.956 2.983 140 0.111
Tenure 77.501 27.522 98 77.268 30.865 140 0.952
Female 0.212 0.168 98 0.138 0.168 140 0.001
Foreign Worker 0.007 0.007 98 0.008 0.012 140 0.319
Firm Size 775.857 768.731 98 689.171 693.513 140 0.365
Log avg. hourly pay 2.517 0.449 98 2.513 0.465 140 0.945
Change in log pay 0.001 0.108 50 0.003 0.114 139 0.882
Foreign rm 0.000 0.000 98 1.000 0.000 140 .
Job creation rate 0.045 0.093 50 0.051 0.188 139 0.814
Job destruction rate 0.083 0.115 50 0.113 0.198 140 0.313
Net job creation rate -0.038 0.172 50 -0.063 0.294 139 0.583
Job reallocation rate 0.128 0.119 50 0.164 0.250 140 0.327
Worker reallocation rate 0.393 0.186 50 0.422 0.334 139 0.562
Churning rate 0.265 0.217 50 0.257 0.365 139 0.880
1995 0.490 0.502 98 0.000 0.000 140 0.000
1996 0.490 0.502 98 0.000 0.000 140 0.000
1997 0.010 0.101 98 0.329 0.471 140 0.000
1998 0.010 0.101 98 0.336 0.474 140 0.000
1999 0.000 0.000 98 0.336 0.474 140 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of rms that switch from domestic to foreign status over the
1995-1999 period. The left columns describe these rms while they are domestic owned and the right columns
describe these same rms when they are foreign owned. See Table 1 for description of variables and weights.
C Identication
Let Y D
it be the potential outcome of interest for individual i (a rm or a worker, in our context)
at time t had (s)he been in state D, where D = 1 if exposed to the treatment (owned by a
domestic or foreign investor or employed by a domestic or foreign rm) and 0 otherwise. Let
the treatment take place at time t. The fundamental identication problem lies in the fact that
we do not observe, at time t, individual i in both states. Therefore, we cannot compute the
individual treatment eect, Y 1
it   Y 0
it. One can, however, if provided with a convenient control
group, estimate the average eect of the treatment on the treated.
The idea behind a dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimator is that we can use an untreated
comparison group to identify temporal variation in the outcome that is not due to the treatment.
However, in order to achieve identication of the general DID estimator we need to assume that
the average outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed parallel paths over
time. This is known as the time invariance assumption,
E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j D = 1] = E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j D = 0]; (10)
where t0 is a time period before the program implementation. The assumption states that,
over time, the outcome variable of treated individuals (D = 1), in the event that they had not
been exposed to the treatment, would have evolved in the same fashion as actually observed for
the individuals not exposed to the treatment (D = 0).
23Table 3: Divestments - descriptive statistics. Sample: rms that are initially foreign
owned and are then acquired by domestic investors
Foreign ownership Domestic ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-value
Schooling 8.315 2.190 65 9.061 2.793 38 0.136
Experience 19.878 3.624 65 20.406 7.592 38 0.634
Tenure 57.403 29.748 65 57.272 43.017 38 0.986
Female 0.173 0.151 65 0.098 0.128 38 0.011
Foreign Worker 0.013 0.013 65 0.013 0.054 38 0.926
Firm Size 230.923 368.663 65 97.026 130.192 38 0.033
Log avg. hourly pay 2.422 0.636 65 2.480 0.639 38 0.657
Change in log pay 0.044 0.244 40 0.027 0.350 35 0.812
Foreign rm 1.000 0.000 65 0.000 0.000 38 .
Job creation rate 0.025 0.050 40 0.100 0.324 35 0.152
Job destruction rate 0.321 0.518 40 0.577 0.749 38 0.083
Net job creation rate -0.297 0.536 40 -0.526 0.902 35 0.178
Job reallocation rate 0.346 0.505 40 0.669 0.741 38 0.027
Worker reallocation rate 0.654 0.504 40 0.824 0.762 35 0.254
Churning rate 0.308 0.304 40 0.098 0.581 35 0.050
1995 0.385 0.490 65 0.000 0.000 38 0.000
1996 0.292 0.458 65 0.132 0.343 38 0.064
1997 0.215 0.414 65 0.158 0.370 38 0.481
1998 0.108 0.312 65 0.342 0.481 38 0.003
1999 0.000 0.000 65 0.368 0.489 38 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of rms that switch from foreign to domestic status over the
1995-1999 period. The left columns describe these rms while they are foreign owned and the right columns
describe these same rms when they are domestic owned. See Table 1 for description of variables and weights.
24Table 4: Firm wage equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling .183 .070 .070 .0007
(.005) (.009) (.009) (.020)
Experience (years) .057 .071 .070 .131
(.008) (.017) (.017) (.060)
Tenure (months) .003 .0004 .0004 .003
(.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.005)
Female (%) -.404 -.154 -.155 -.418
(.036) (.063) (.063) (.447)
Foreigners (%) .627 .136 .138 3.147
(.658) (.569) (.569) (.635)
Foreign rm .550 .288 -.005 -.003
(.014) (.013) (.026) (.024)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) -.046 -.048 .046 -.264
(.020) (.020) (.281) (.159)
F-to-D switch (divestment) -.064 -.080 .091 -.167
(.093) (.088) (.301) (.160)
Obs. 6197 6197 6197 6197 6197 6197 139 139
R
2 .411 .64 .845 .851 .845 .852 .959 .982
Notes: Dependent variable: Log average real hourly wage. All columns includes rm-level controls (size, industry
dummies and state dummies) and year dummies. Even columns includes worker-level controls (average of the
following characteristics of workers: schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square; and the share of
female workers and of foreign workers). `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned
(and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic owned in the
previous period(s) and is foreign owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D switcher'
is a dummy taking value one if the rm was foreign owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic owned in
the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). All rm-years used in all specications, except in the nal two
columns (only rms that switch ownership, domestic or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period before
changing and in the rst period after changing). All rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard errors.
Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
25Table 5: Firm size equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling -.127 -.192 -.189 .005
(.015) (.020) (.020) (.106)
Experience (years) -.039 -.002 -.001 -.002
(.025) (.040) (.040) (.314)
Tenure (months) .027 .004 .003 .028
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.031)
Female (%) -.614 -.091 -.091 3.304
(.135) (.160) (.159) (1.885)
Foreigners (%) -4.044 -2.181 -2.179 -3.844
(.428) (.400) (.399) (3.725)
Foreign rm .219 .091 .487 .334
(.034) (.036) (.099) (.094)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) -.005 -.024 -.082 .233
(.051) (.047) (.801) (.617)
F-to-D switch (divestment) -1.199 -.905 -1.113 -.538
(.301) (.266) (.778) (.653)
Obs. 6247 6244 6247 6244 6247 6244 146 146
R
2 .11 .297 .873 .912 .874 .913 .92 .95
Notes: Dependent variable: Log rm size (number of workers in each year, weighted by length of spell of each
individual). All columns includes rm-level controls (industry dummies and state dummies) and year dummies.
Even columns includes worker-level controls (average of the following characteristics of workers: schooling, expe-
rience and its square, tenure and its square; and the share of female workers and of foreign workers). `Foreign
rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F switcher'
is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic owned in the previous period(s) and is foreign owned in the
current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was foreign
owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). All
rm-years used in all specications, except in the nal two columns (only rms that switch ownership, domestic
or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period before changing and in the rst period after changing). All
rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
26Table 6: Net job creation equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling -.024 -.082 -.081 .067
(.006) (.014) (.014) (.150)
Experience (years) .012 -.032 -.031 -.051
(.009) (.024) (.024) (.265)
Tenure (months) .00002 -.006 -.006 .015
(.0008) (.002) (.002) (.024)
Female (%) -.140 -.108 -.107 2.649
(.054) (.094) (.094) (1.538)
Foreigners (%) -1.168 -.483 -.469 -2.340
(.235) (.437) (.433) (3.767)
Foreign rm .053 .059 .146 .104
(.011) (.012) (.070) (.075)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) -.022 -.019 .195 .500
(.059) (.059) (.354) (.324)
F-to-D switch (divestment) -.418 -.417 -.572 -.187
(.232) (.240) (.280) (.316)
Obs. 4862 4859 4862 4859 4862 4859 136 136
R
2 .023 .127 .401 .472 .403 .475 .58 .661
Notes: Dependent variable: Net job creation rate (dened as in the text: the change in rm size divided by
the average rm size, if positive, zero otherwise). All columns includes rm-level controls (industry dummies
and state dummies) and year dummies. Even columns includes worker-level controls (average of the following
characteristics of workers: schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square; and the share of female
workers and of foreign workers). `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned
(and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic owned in the
previous period(s) and is foreign owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D switcher'
is a dummy taking value one if the rm was foreign owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic owned in
the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). All rm-years used in all specications, except in the nal two
columns (only rms that switch ownership, domestic or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period before
changing and in the rst period after changing). All rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard errors.
Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
27Table 7: Job destruction equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling .025 .062 .061 -.080
(.006) (.012) (.013) (.072)
Experience (years) -.003 .031 .031 .114
(.009) (.020) (.020) (.190)
Tenure (months) -.002 .001 .002 -.020
(.0009) (.002) (.002) (.018)
Female (%) .120 .081 .081 -2.548
(.048) (.080) (.079) (1.232)
Foreigners (%) 1.146 .660 .657 3.095
(.231) (.423) (.421) (2.701)
Foreign rm -.046 -.052 -.118 -.075
(.009) (.011) (.064) (.067)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) .052 .048 .860 -.067
(.036) (.037) (.726) (.752)
F-to-D switch (divestment) .336 .269 1.217 .316
(.195) (.198) (.740) (.712)
Obs. 4897 4894 4897 4894 4897 4894 140 140
R
2 .025 .135 .445 .504 .447 .506 .597 .735
Notes: Dependent variable: Job destruction rate (dened as in the text: the absolute value of the change in rm
size divided by the average rm size, if change is negative, zero otherwise). All columns includes rm-level controls
(industry dummies and state dummies) and year dummies. Even columns includes worker-level controls (average
of the following characteristics of workers: schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square; and the
share of female workers and of foreign workers). `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is
foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic
owned in the previous period(s) and is foreign owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D
switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was foreign owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic
owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). All rm-years used in all specications, except in the
nal two columns (only rms that switch ownership, domestic or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period
before changing and in the rst period after changing). All rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard
errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
28Table 8: Job reallocation equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling .027 .049 .048 -.062
(.006) (.012) (.012) (.061)
Experience (years) .001 .026 .026 .128
(.009) (.018) (.018) (.146)
Tenure (months) -.005 -.004 -.004 -.022
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.015)
Female (%) .100 .065 .065 -2.418
(.047) (.076) (.076) (1.124)
Foreigners (%) 1.104 .782 .780 3.388
(.232) (.425) (.423) (2.374)
Foreign rm -.040 -.044 -.112 -.078
(.009) (.011) (.064) (.062)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) .083 .082 .963 -.025
(.041) (.040) (.688) (.683)
F-to-D switch (divestment) .352 .254 1.128 .163
(.190) (.183) (.691) (.630)
Obs. 4897 4894 4897 4894 4897 4894 140 140
R
2 .027 .143 .465 .506 .468 .508 .638 .801
Notes: Dependent variable: Job reallocation rate (dened as in the text: the sum of job creation and job
destruction divided by the average rm size). All columns includes rm-level controls (industry dummies and state
dummies) and year dummies. Even columns includes worker-level controls (average of the following characteristics
of workers: schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square; and the share of female workers and of
foreign workers). `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero
otherwise). `D-to-F switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic owned in the previous period(s)
and is foreign owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D switcher' is a dummy taking
value one if the rm was foreign owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic owned in the current period(s)
(and value zero otherwise). All rm-years used in all specications, except in the nal two columns (only rms
that switch ownership, domestic or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period before changing and in the
rst period after changing). All rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
29Table 9: Worker reallocation equations
OLS-1 OLS-2 FE-1 FE-2 FE-3 FE-4 FE-5 FE-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling .023 .062 .062 -.065
(.005) (.012) (.012) (.099)
Experience (years) .002 .029 .028 .029
(.008) (.018) (.018) (.141)
Tenure (months) -.014 -.018 -.018 -.035
(.0009) (.002) (.002) (.014)
Female (%) .087 .018 .017 -1.258
(.042) (.074) (.074) (1.079)
Foreigners (%) .882 .534 .526 2.877
(.241) (.400) (.397) (2.302)
Foreign rm -.050 -.042 -.088 -.077
(.010) (.010) (.065) (.049)
D-to-F switch (acquisition) .095 .096 .087 -.283
(.056) (.048) (.257) (.207)
F-to-D switch (divestment) .488 .301 .568 .225
(.194) (.162) (.222) (.209)
Obs. 4862 4859 4862 4859 4862 4859 136 136
R
2 .041 .313 .509 .599 .514 .601 .627 .824
Notes: Dependent variable: Worker reallocation rate (dened as in the text: the sum of hirings and separations
divided by the average rm size). All columns includes rm-level controls (industry dummies and state dummies)
and year dummies. Even columns includes worker-level controls (average of the following characteristics of workers:
schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square; and the share of female workers and of foreign workers).
`Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F
switcher' is a dummy taking value one if the rm was domestic owned in the previous period(s) and is foreign
owned in the current period(s) (and value zero otherwise). `F-to-D switcher' is a dummy taking value one if
the rm was foreign owned in the previous period(s) and is domestic owned in the current period(s) (and value
zero otherwise). All rm-years used in all specications, except in the nal two columns (only rms that switch
ownership, domestic or foreign, are observed, and only in the last period before changing and in the rst period
after changing). All rm-years receive the same weight. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **:
0.05; ***: 0.01.
30Table 10: Worker-level descriptive statistics: Only workers that always stay in rms that are either
always domestic or always foreign owned over the period 1995-1999
Always Domestic Always Foreign
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-test
Schooling 7.921 3.740 883147 8.827 3.779 1254490 0.000
Experience 18.782 11.120 882008 17.239 10.088 1254236 0.000
Tenure 67.485 69.466 883278 71.833 72.941 1254988 0.000
Female 0.192 0.394 883278 0.174 0.379 1254988 0.000
Foreign Worker 0.005 0.069 883278 0.010 0.097 1254988 0.000
Firm Size 2402.242 4054.423 883278 3197.021 5151.050 1254988 0.000
New hire 0.200 0.400 883278 0.204 0.403 1254988 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.131 0.841 852499 2.355 0.845 1227190 0.000
Change in log pay 0.037 0.370 517186 0.044 0.328 765046 0.000
Foreign rm 0.000 0.000 883278 1.000 0.000 1254988 .
Foreign status switch 0.000 0.000 883278 0.000 0.000 1254988 .
Firm mover 0.000 0.000 883278 0.000 0.000 1254988 .
Job creation rate 0.063 0.170 653049 0.072 0.166 962365 0.000
Job destruction rate 0.092 0.146 656934 0.079 0.152 973334 0.000
Net job creation rate -0.029 0.249 653049 -0.008 0.250 962365 0.000
Job reallocation rate 0.155 0.196 656934 0.150 0.198 973334 0.000
Worker reallocation rate 0.381 0.251 653049 0.411 0.279 962365 0.000
Churning rate 0.226 0.311 653049 0.259 0.269 962365 0.000
1995 0.256 0.437 883278 0.224 0.417 1254988 0.000
1996 0.224 0.417 883278 0.211 0.408 1254988 0.000
1997 0.200 0.400 883278 0.205 0.404 1254988 0.000
1998 0.165 0.371 883278 0.181 0.385 1254988 0.000
1999 0.154 0.361 883278 0.179 0.383 1254988 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of workers that do not change their aliation between domestic or foreign
rms over the 1995-1999 period. However, workers may move between rms, provided they are in the same `sector'. Schooling
is measured in years; experience dened as Mincer experience; tenure measured in months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking
value one for workers who are not Brazilian nationals, `rm size' is measured in terms of the number of workers in the rm
in 31 December of the year, `dismissal without cause' is a dummay variable taking value one if the worker was red without
cause from his/her previous job, `new hire' is a dummy taking value one if the worker is in the rst year in the current rm,
`reemployed' is a dummy taking value one if the worker left and then returned to the current rm, pay is measured in 2006
`reais', `foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one for rms owned at least at 50% by foreign investors. Job creation rate
and the following job and worker ow rates are dened in the standard way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc, are dummy
variables for each year.
31Table 11: Worker-level descriptive statistics: Only workers that stay in rms that are initially
domestic owned and are then acquired by foreign investors
Domestic ownership Foreign ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-value
Schooling 8.347 3.778 50816 8.844 3.694 67515 0.000
Experience 18.578 10.127 50814 19.822 10.007 67511 0.000
Tenure 88.920 77.001 50818 107.273 79.733 67515 0.000
Female 0.184 0.387 50818 0.130 0.337 67515 0.000
Foreign Worker 0.006 0.076 50818 0.006 0.074 67515 0.474
Firm Size 1518.361 921.666 50818 1399.844 795.025 67515 0.000
New hire 0.157 0.364 50818 0.030 0.171 67515 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.421 0.785 50240 2.441 0.790 65401 0.000
Change in log pay 0.007 0.317 22739 0.019 0.334 64825 0.000
Foreign rm 0.000 0.000 50818 1.000 0.000 67515 .
Foreign status switch 1.000 0.000 50818 1.000 0.000 67515 .
Firm mover 0.000 0.000 50818 0.000 0.000 67515 .
Job creation rate 0.066 0.126 27978 0.063 0.215 66933 0.038
Job destruction rate 0.107 0.154 27978 0.071 0.124 67515 0.000
Net job creation rate -0.041 0.232 27978 -0.008 0.266 66933 0.000
Job reallocation rate 0.173 0.160 27978 0.134 0.229 67515 0.000
Worker reallocation rate 0.392 0.207 27978 0.335 0.292 66933 0.000
Churning rate 0.219 0.274 27978 0.200 0.406 66933 0.000
1995 0.449 0.497 50818 0.000 0.000 67515 0.000
1996 0.536 0.499 50818 0.000 0.000 67515 0.000
1997 0.007 0.082 50818 0.375 0.484 67515 0.000
1998 0.008 0.087 50818 0.330 0.470 67515 0.000
1999 0.000 0.000 50818 0.295 0.456 67515 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of workers that change their aliation from domestic to foreign rms over
the 1995-1999 period because their rms are acquired and they stay in that rm. Schooling is measured in years; experience
dened as Mincer experience; tenure measured in months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking value one for workers who are
not Brazilian nationals, `rm size' is measured in terms of the number of workers in the rm in 31 December of the year,
`dismissal without cause' is a dummay variable taking value one if the worker was red without cause from his/her previous
job, `new hire' is a dummy taking value one if the worker is in the rst year in the current rm, `reemployed' is a dummy
taking value one if the worker left and then returned to the current rm, pay is measured in 2006 `reais', `foreign rm' is a
dummy taking value one for rms owned at least at 50% by foreign investors. Job creation rate and the following job and
worker ow rates are dened in the standard way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc, are dummy variables for each year.
32Table 12: Worker-level descriptive statistics: Only workers that stay in rms that are initially
foreign owned and are then acquired by domestic investors
Foreign ownership Domestic ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-test
Schooling 8.748 4.291 1949 9.867 4.152 1277 0.000
Experience 20.139 10.307 1948 20.295 9.944 1277 0.670
Tenure 70.565 66.534 1949 79.816 64.334 1277 0.000
Female 0.144 0.351 1949 0.104 0.306 1277 0.001
Foreign Worker 0.014 0.119 1949 0.012 0.108 1277 0.526
Firm Size 182.455 124.963 1949 134.033 93.096 1277 0.000
New hire 0.176 0.381 1949 0.031 0.172 1277 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.577 0.829 1916 2.619 0.912 919 0.220
Change in log pay -0.080 0.370 1033 0.085 0.412 905 0.000
Foreign rm 1.000 0.000 1949 0.000 0.000 1277 .
Foreign status switch 1.000 0.000 1949 1.000 0.000 1277 .
Firm mover 0.000 0.000 1949 0.000 0.000 1277 .
Job creation rate 0.037 0.062 1228 0.063 0.237 1194 0.000
Job destruction rate 0.251 0.382 1228 0.240 0.396 1277 0.453
Net job creation rate -0.215 0.410 1228 -0.193 0.502 1194 0.256
Job reallocation rate 0.288 0.362 1228 0.298 0.426 1277 0.512
Worker reallocation rate 0.516 0.361 1228 0.503 0.447 1194 0.416
Churning rate 0.229 0.142 1228 0.184 0.434 1194 0.001
1995 0.370 0.483 1949 0.000 0.000 1277 0.000
1996 0.318 0.466 1949 0.090 0.286 1277 0.000
1997 0.180 0.384 1949 0.300 0.458 1277 0.000
1998 0.132 0.339 1949 0.305 0.460 1277 0.000
1999 0.000 0.000 1949 0.305 0.461 1277 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of workers that change their aliation from foreign to domestic
rms over the 1995-1999 period because their rms are acquired and they stay in that rm. Schooling is measured
in years; experience dened as Mincer experience; tenure measured in months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking
value one for workers who are not Brazilian nationals, `rm size' is measured in terms of the number of workers in
the rm in 31 December of the year, `dismissal without cause' is a dummay variable taking value one if the worker
was red without cause from his/her previous job, `new hire' is a dummy taking value one if the worker is in the
rst year in the current rm, `reemployed' is a dummy taking value one if the worker left and then returned to the
current rm, pay is measured in 2006 `reais', `foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one for rms owned at least at
50% by foreign investors. Job creation rate and the following job and worker ow rates are dened in the standard
way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc, are dummy variables for each year.
33Table 13: Worker-level descriptive statistics: Workers that move from domestic to foreign rms
Domestic ownership Foreign ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-test
Schooling 8.559 3.541 22729 9.586 3.554 20899 0.000
Experience 15.011 9.017 22714 15.632 8.695 20899 0.000
Tenure 51.001 50.312 22734 38.187 52.606 20900 0.000
Female 0.264 0.441 22734 0.096 0.294 20900 0.000
Foreign Worker 0.005 0.070 22734 0.005 0.069 20900 0.940
Firm Size 2691.429 2304.134 22734 3132.178 3178.156 20900 0.000
New hire 0.229 0.420 22734 0.456 0.498 20900 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.248 0.754 21887 2.378 0.797 20390 0.000
Change in log pay 0.038 0.434 11409 0.050 0.395 19269 0.015
Foreign rm 0.000 0.000 22734 1.000 0.000 20900 .
Foreign status switch 1.000 0.000 22734 1.000 0.000 20900 .
Firm mover 1.000 0.000 22734 1.000 0.000 20900 .
Job creation rate 0.076 0.132 14513 0.250 0.408 20162 0.000
Job destruction rate 0.062 0.119 14664 0.092 0.156 20364 0.000
Net job creation rate 0.013 0.203 14513 0.157 0.487 20162 0.000
Job reallocation rate 0.137 0.149 14664 0.340 0.379 20364 0.000
Worker reallocation rate 0.470 0.231 14513 0.625 0.429 20162 0.000
Churning rate 0.332 0.283 14513 0.282 0.279 20162 0.000
1995 0.355 0.479 22734 0.026 0.158 20900 0.000
1996 0.308 0.462 22734 0.073 0.261 20900 0.000
1997 0.238 0.426 22734 0.151 0.358 20900 0.000
1998 0.083 0.275 22734 0.337 0.473 20900 0.000
1999 0.017 0.128 22734 0.413 0.492 20900 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of workers that change their aliation from domestic to foreign rms
over the 1995-1999 period because they move between rms. Schooling is measured in years; experience dened as Mincer
experience; tenure measured in months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking value one for workers who are not Brazilian
nationals, `rm size' is measured in terms of the number of workers in the rm in 31 December of the year, `dismissal
without cause' is a dummay variable taking value one if the worker was red without cause from his/her previous job,
`new hire' is a dummy taking value one if the worker is in the rst year in the current rm, `reemployed' is a dummy
taking value one if the worker left and then returned to the current rm, pay is measured in 2006 `reais', `foreign rm' is a
dummy taking value one for rms owned at least at 50% by foreign investors. Job creation rate and the following job and
worker ow rates are dened in the standard way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc, are dummy variables for each year.
34Table 14: Worker-level descriptive statistics: Workers that move from foreign to domestic rms
Foreign ownership Domestic ownership
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N p-test
Schooling 10.169 3.632 6665 10.496 3.478 6563 0.000
Experience 14.464 8.649 6665 15.179 8.253 6553 0.000
Tenure 46.079 55.315 6668 26.644 38.200 6563 0.000
Female 0.172 0.377 6668 0.119 0.324 6563 0.000
Foreign Worker 0.010 0.098 6668 0.007 0.083 6563 0.067
Firm Size 1639.543 2378.396 6668 1838.680 2382.716 6563 0.000
New hire 0.330 0.470 6668 0.455 0.498 6563 0.000
Log avg. hourly pay 2.515 0.879 6341 2.444 0.921 6056 0.000
Change in log pay 0.022 0.389 2876 -0.025 0.508 5450 0.000
Foreign rm 1.000 0.000 6668 0.000 0.000 6563 .
Foreign status switch 1.000 0.000 6668 1.000 0.000 6563 .
Firm mover 1.000 0.000 6668 1.000 0.000 6563 .
Job creation rate 0.137 0.280 3834 0.094 0.176 6266 0.000
Job destruction rate 0.078 0.161 3877 0.073 0.160 6395 0.130
Net job creation rate 0.059 0.355 3834 0.020 0.267 6266 0.000
Job reallocation rate 0.213 0.287 3877 0.165 0.207 6395 0.000
Worker reallocation rate 0.513 0.340 3834 0.446 0.315 6266 0.000
Churning rate 0.297 0.303 3834 0.277 0.302 6266 0.001
1995 0.419 0.493 6668 0.026 0.158 6563 0.000
1996 0.249 0.432 6668 0.196 0.397 6563 0.000
1997 0.156 0.362 6668 0.230 0.421 6563 0.000
1998 0.103 0.304 6668 0.232 0.422 6563 0.000
1999 0.074 0.262 6668 0.316 0.465 6563 0.000
Notes: This table describes the characteristics of workers that change their aliation from foreign to domestic rms
over the 1995-1999 period because they move between rms. Schooling is measured in years; experience dened as
Mincer experience; tenure measured in months; `foreign worker' is a dummy taking value one for workers who are not
Brazilian nationals, `rm size' is measured in terms of the number of workers in the rm in 31 December of the year,
`dismissal without cause' is a dummay variable taking value one if the worker was red without cause from his/her
previous job, `new hire' is a dummy taking value one if the worker is in the rst year in the current rm, `reemployed'
is a dummy taking value one if the worker left and then returned to the current rm, pay is measured in 2006 `reais',
`foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one for rms owned at least at 50% by foreign investors. Job creation rate and
the following job and worker ow rates are dened in the standard way (see main text). `1995', `1996', etc, are dummy
variables for each year.
35Table 15: Worker-level wage equations
OLS1 All-FE Stayers1 Movers1 Stayers2 Movers2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling .102 .013 .012 .021 -.004 .031
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.007) (.008)
Experience .047 .030 .029 .037 .022 .033
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.012) (.008)
Experience
2/100 -.062 -.054 -.054 -.068 -.038 -.037
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.021) (.013)
Tenure/10 .041 .021 .019 .027 .028 .035
(.007) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.010) (.004)
Tenure
2/1000 -.007 -.008 -.008 -.009 -.014 -.011





Foreign rm .099 -.008 -.027 .040 -.044 .078
(.061) (.017) (.024) (.017) (.026) (.011)
Obs. 2295926 2295926 2196359 99567 55626 27665
No. Firms 1348 1348 1348 1214 70 1067
R
2 .523 .939 .941 .902 .963 .92
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square,
tenure and its square, a female dummy variable and a foreign worker (non-Brazilian) dummy variable. All
columns except (1) include worker xed eects. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is
foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed
in a domestic rm in the previous periods and is employed in a foreign owned rm in the current period (and
value zero otherwise). `F-to-D mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed in a foreign rm in
the previous periods and is employed in a domestic owned rm in the current period (and value zero otherwise).
All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
36Table 16: Worker-level wage equations, including rm-level controls
OLS1 All-FE Stayers1 Movers1 Stayers2 Movers2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling .092 .013 .012 .022 -.004 .033
(.002) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007)
Experience .047 .030 .029 .038 .022 .035
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.012) (.008)
Experience
2/100 -.062 -.053 -.053 -.068 -.039 -.038
(.003) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.021) (.013)
Tenure/10 .038 .021 .020 .028 .028 .033
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.009) (.004)
Tenure
2/1000 -.007 -.009 -.008 -.009 -.015 -.011





Foreign rm .127 -.011 -.026 .037 -.052 .066
(.041) (.017) (.023) (.019) (.027) (.012)
Obs. 2295926 2295926 2196359 99567 55626 27665
No. Firms 1348 1348 1348 1214 70 1067
R
2 .585 .939 .941 .903 .964 .922
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square,
tenure and its square, a female dummy variable and a foreign worker (non-Brazilian) dummy variable. All
columns except (1) include worker xed eects. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is
foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed
in a domestic rm in the previous periods and is employed in a foreign owned rm in the current period (and
value zero otherwise). `F-to-D mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed in a foreign rm in
the previous periods and is employed in a domestic owned rm in the current period (and value zero otherwise).
All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
37Table 17: Worker-level wage equations, by mobility type
OLS1 All-FE Stayers1 Movers1 Stayers2 Movers2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling .101 .019 .017 .022 -.002 .036
(.004) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.011)
Experience .045 .025 .023 .036 .028 .028
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.010) (.011)
Experience
2/100 -.061 -.039 -.037 -.056 -.044 -.009
(.005) (.007) (.008) (.011) (.019) (.019)
Tenure/10 .026 .012 .011 .014 .013 .025
(.009) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.008) (.004)
Tenure
2/1000 -.003 -.005 -.005 -.005 -.008 -.008





F-to-D mover -.073 -.091 -.065 -.086 -.043 -.019
(.063) (.013) (.017) (.015) (.086) (.026)
D-to-F mover .008 -.038 -.034 -.045 -.088 .065
(.050) (.017) (.021) (.026) (.081) (.019)
Obs. 1459828 1459828 1386945 72883 50477 21600
No. Firms 1311 1311 1309 1112 69 948
R
2 .501 .945 .946 .926 .969 .946
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square,
tenure and its square, a female dummy variable and a foreign worker (non-Brazilian) dummy variable. All
columns except (1) include worker xed eects. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is
foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed
in a domestic rm in the previous periods and is employed in a foreign owned rm in the current period (and
value zero otherwise). `F-to-D mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed in a foreign rm in
the previous periods and is employed in a domestic owned rm in the current period (and value zero otherwise).
All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
38Table 18: Worker-level wage equations, by mobility type, with rm-level controls
OLS1 All-FE Stayers1 Movers1 Stayers2 Movers2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling .092 .019 .017 .023 -.002 .039
(.003) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.010)
Experience .045 .025 .023 .037 .028 .031
(.002) (.004) (.005) (.008) (.011) (.011)
Experience
2/100 -.060 -.039 -.037 -.057 -.045 -.015
(.003) (.008) (.008) (.011) (.019) (.019)
Tenure/10 .025 .012 .012 .014 .013 .023
(.005) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.008) (.004)
Tenure
2/1000 -.004 -.005 -.005 -.005 -.008 -.008





F-to-D mover -.077 -.087 -.043 -.088 -.021 -.023
(.052) (.013) (.014) (.016) (.099) (.026)
D-to-F mover -.025 -.041 -.030 -.056 -.089 .034
(.044) (.018) (.021) (.027) (.085) (.019)
Obs. 1459828 1459828 1386945 72883 50477 21600
No. Firms 1311 1311 1309 1112 69 948
R
2 .566 .945 .946 .927 .969 .947
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square,
tenure and its square, a female dummy variable and a foreign worker (non-Brazilian) dummy variable. All
columns except (1) include worker xed eects. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is
foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `D-to-F mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed
in a domestic rm in the previous periods and is employed in a foreign owned rm in the current period (and
value zero otherwise). `F-to-D mover' is a dummy taking value one if the worker was employed in a foreign rm in
the previous periods and is employed in a domestic owned rm in the current period (and value zero otherwise).
All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
39If assumption (10) holds, the DID estimate of the average treatment eect on the treated
can be obtained by the sample analogs of
b DID = fE[Yit jD = 1]   E[Yit jD = 0]g   fE[Yit0 jD = 1]   E[Yit0 jD = 0]g: (11)
The expression above simply states that the impact of the program is given by the dierence
between participants and nonparticipants in the before-after dierence in outcomes.
The time invariance assumption can be too stringent if the treated and control groups are not
balanced in covariates that are believed to be associated with the outcome variable (Ashenfelter
1978). The DID setup can be extended to accommodate a set of covariates and this is usually
done in a linear way, taking into account eligibility specic eects and time/aggregate eects.
In the following model, b D corresponds to the DID estimate obtained on a sample of treatment
and control units:
Yit = D + t + 0Zit + DDt + "it; (12)
where D is as before and represents the eligibility-specic intercept, t captures time or
aggregate eects and equals 0 for the `before' period and 1 for the `after' period, and Z is
a vector of covariates included to correct for dierences in observed characteristics between
individuals in treatment and control groups.
This estimator controls for both dierences in the Zs and for time-specic eects, but it does
not impose common support on the distribution of the Z0s across the cells dened by the D-in-
D approach (namely, before and after, and treatment and control). In our case, we minimise
problems of common support by drawing on a particularly homogeneous sample across domestic
and foreign rms.10
D RAIS
RAIS (`Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais', Annual Social Information Report) is an admin-
istrative report led by all tax registered Brazilian establishments. Since the information may
be used for investigation about labor legislation compliance, rms that do not comply with it
do not le in RAIS. Thus, this data set can be considered a census of the formal Brazilian labor
market (State-owned enterprises, public administration and non-prot organizations are also
required to le the report.) Firms that do not provide accurate information will be committing
an oense sanctioned by law, a threat that is likely to lead to very high standards of data quality.
RAIS covers the whole country and is carried out annually. The information is collected
every year in the rst quarter, referring to the previous year. Every tax registered enterprise
receives a unique tax number (CNPJ). This number is composed by a specic rm part and a
complement for each unit (local plant or establishment) that the rm operates.
The main variables available from the survey at the establishment level are:
 Geographic location: State, metropolitan region, county;
 Activity sector: CNAE (National Economic Activity Classication); sector Level (10 cat-
egories); activity (42 categories); sub-activity (about 560 categories);
 Establishment Size: number of workers, number of wage earners, number of owners;
10In any case, we believe it would be worthwhile to conduct a dierence-in-dierences matching analysis (Martins
2004). Another approach is to take as a control group not the rms that are not acquired but those that are
acquired by investors of the same nationality. In this way one could isolate the foreign eect from the change in
ownership change eect. We leave these two complementary approaches for future work.
40 Establishment Type: Private enterprise, private foundation, State-owned enterprise, State
foundation, joint public-private enterprise, non-governmental organization, government,
nonprot enterprise, notary.
At the employee level, the following information is available (although we did not obtain
access to all variables listed):
 Occupation: occupation classes (CBO-Brazilian Occupation Classication system - about
350 categories); subgroup (84 categories); group (11 categories);
 Personal Characteristics: schooling (9 classes), age, gender, nationality.
 Contract Information: month of admission, month of separation, December wage rate
(13th monthly salary), average yearly wage, tenure, separation cause (red with/without
fair reason, separation with/without fair reason, retiring, transfer to other units or rm),
contract type (work card, civil service, isolated worker, temporary worker), contract status
(in activity or paid leave, leave without paid, occupation accident, military service, ma-
ternity leave, sick leave, inactive), admission type (rst placement in rm, re-employment,
transferred), contract hours (exclusive overtime).
As some other matched employer-employee panels, RAIS is based on worker spells, dened
by an occupation-establishment-contract group in each year. In other words, if a worker changes
his/her occupation or establishment or contract type in a given year, there will be one separate
observation for each case.
With the establishment identication number (CNPJ) it is possible to follow all establish-
ments that le the RAIS survey. Moreover, with the worker's national insurance number, it is
possible to follow all workers that remain in the formal sector and to match the worker's charac-
teristics with those of the establishment. Therefore, we can create a panel that matches workers
to their establishments and follow each of them over time. It was using the rm identication
numbers that we have merged the three data sets described in this appendix.
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